The optimal allocation of a public health care budget across treatments must take account of the way in which care is rationed within treatments since this will a¤ect their marginal value. We investigate the optimal allocation rules for health care systems where user charges are …xed and care is rationed by waiting. The optimal waiting time is higher for treatments with demands more elastic to waiting time, higher costs, lower charges, smaller marginal welfare loss from waiting by treated patients, and smaller marginal welfare losses from underconsumption of care. The results hold for a wide range of welfarist and non-welfarist objective functions and for systems in which there is also a private health care sector. They imply that allocation rules based purely on cost e¤ectiveness ratios are suboptimal because they assume that there is no rationing within treatments.
Introduction
suming that patients are drawn at random from those who could bene…t. But there are almost no examples of random rationing in public health care systems. Publicly funded health care is generally rationed by money or waiting time prices. Such rationing implies that treated patients have a higher perceived bene…t than those not treated and that the health gain of the marginal patient falls as supply is increased and the money or waiting time price is reduced. Thus CER based rules for allocating budgets across treatments rest on an incorrect speci…cation of the way the supply of a given treatment is rationed. Even if one accepts the value judgements underlying them, CER based allocation rules require modi…cation because the rationing mechanism within treatments a¤ects the marginal value of treatments.
Only one paper on priority setting across treatments has taken account of the way in which patients are rationed within treatments.
2 Smith (2005) considers a health care system which is …nanced by a mixture of an exogenous budget and user charge revenue. The volumes of di¤erent treatments are determined by the patient demands at the user charges set by the health planner. It is assumed that all patients have same health bene…t from a given treatment but, because patients have di¤erent incomes and utility of income is concave, increases in the user charge reduce demand by discouraging poorer potential patients. The optimal prices which maximise total health gain are determined by the exogenous CERs and by the money price elasticity of demands. Treatments with a high CER are not provided, those with a low CER are provided at no charge, and those with intermediate CERs are provided at a below cost price. In contrast to the usual Ramsey public sector pricing rules (Ramsey, 1927) , charges are higher (and the volume of treatment smaller) the more elastic is demand with respect to the charge.
The result is similar to that derived by Besley (1988) for optimal health insurance contracts. In the usual Ramsey case prices are set to raise a given sum in revenue and so must exceed marginal cost. In the case of health care, either because of risk aversion (Besley, 1988) or because of an extra welfarist 2 Hoel (2007) shows that the simple CER based allocation rules require modi…cation when some patients will buy the treatment in the private sector if it is not provided in the public sector. Consequently not all treatments provided in the public sector have lower CERs than those not provided. For example, a treatment for which there is a private sector alternative may not be provided in the public sector even though it has a lower CER than a treatment which is provided but for which there is no private sector alternative. The intuition is that when a private sector alternative is available the gain from public provision is the cost saving to the patients who would have bought it in the private sector. This cost saving is less than the utility gain from treatment compared with no treatment. Thus the average welfare gain from a treatment is lower if it has a private sector alternative. Hoel (2007) does however assume that if a treatment is provided it is provided to all patients. Hence he does not need to consider how care is actually rationed within treatments.
desire to increase consumption of health care (Smith, 2005) , the aim is to spend a …xed sum and so prices are less than marginal cost. But, whether the constraint is to raise a given revenue or to spend a given budget, there is less welfare loss in departing from marginal cost prices the less elastic is demand. In the standard Ramsey revenue raising case, prices are raised further above marginal cost for goods with less elastic demands. In the budget spending case of health care, prices are lowered further below marginal cost the less elastic is demand. Hence prices (or coinsurance rates) are higher for goods with more elastic demands.
In this paper we examine allocation across treatments for a heath care system where, in contrast to Smith (2005) , waiting time rather than money price rations demand. We also allow for the possibility that patient health bene…t from a treatment varies across patients and we consider a more general welfare function which includes health gain maximisation as a special case.
Unlike a money price, a waiting time price imposes a pure deadweight loss: it is a cost to patients which is not o¤set by any gain to the providers. Longer waiting times reduce the value of treatment because of lost expected bene…t, temporary discomfort and pain, and, for some pathologies, the higher risk of permanent reductions in health (see Hoel and Saether (2003) for some detailed examples of the cost of waiting).
The change in waiting time costs incurred by patients when supply of a treatment is reduced is determined by the increase in the wait and the reduction in the number of patients who wait. The reduction in the number waiting is equal to the reduction in the supply of treatment. A given reduction in the supply of treatment will generate a smaller increase in the waiting time the more elastic the demand with respect to waiting time. Thus the more elastic the demand with respect to waiting time, the smaller the increase in waiting time costs when supply is reduced and the waiting time increased. Hence, when there is rationing by waiting within treatments, the optimal allocation of resources across treatments should result in longer waiting times for treatments where demand is more elastic with respect to waiting time. Waiting times should also be longer for treatments where treated patients su¤er less from increased waiting times.
The above argument holds whether or not the welfare function is paternalistic. If the welfare function does not respect individual choices between treatment and no treatment there is a further factor in ‡uencing the waiting time: the welfare loss associated with indi¤erent patients displaced as waiting time increases. With a paternalistic welfare function patients may place too low a value on treatment relative to no treatment, so that there is a welfare loss associated with the marginal patient's decision not to be treated. We show that waiting times should be lower, ceteris paribus, for treatments 4 where there is a larger welfare loss for the marginal patient.
Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 derives and discusses the main results for allocation rules between treatments. Section 4 extends the analysis by allowing patients to opt for a private sector and shows that the existance of a private sector makes no essential di¤erence to the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model speci…cation 2.1 Preferences, demand, and waiting times All health care is produced in the public health care system. Demand for treatment is rationed by waiting. To reduce notational clutter we assume there are no user charges. We show in section 3.3 that allowing for positive …xed user charges makes no essential di¤erence to the results. Health bene…t and income for patients with condition i is distributed with density f i (b; y) and distribution function F i (b; y).The marginal distribution function for income is F y (y). The total population is normalised to 1. The planner knows the distribution functions but cannot prioritise individual patients on the basis of their health gain or their income. 3 The formulation allows for the possibility that receiving treatment can increase income. Let y be income if treated, assume condition i reduces income if not treated by L i (y), and denote utility if not treated asv
. 4 We assume that waiting times vary across treatments but are constant within treatments. Gravelle and Siciliani (2006) analyse the e¤ect of waiting-time prioritisation within a treatment when bene…t is partially observable through a continous variable (like age). They …nd that prioritisation within treatments can increase welfare but has ambiguous e¤ects on the marginal value of treatment. Thus its e¤ect on allocations across treatments is also ambiguous.
The key assumption is that increases in waiting time reduce the utility from treatment compared with the no treatment alternative. The most salient form of rationing by waiting time is rationing by waiting list for elective care. Individuals bear a cost in getting on the waiting list for treatment. In systems with gatekeeping general practitioners, patients …rst have to consult their general practitioner to get a referral and then incur further costs in attending hospital outpatient department to be seen by a specialist who will then place them on a waiting list. The longer the time potential patients know they will have to wait on the list, the less the discounted value of the treatment and the less likely are they to be willing to incur the initial costs of joining the list (Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984; Martin and Smith, 1999; Farnworth, 2003) . In some systems there is rationing by waiting in line (queues). Waiting for treatment has an opportunity cost of forgone work or leisure time, as well as possible e¤ects on the health gain. Rationing by waiting line can be used for minor ailments in hospital accident and emergency rooms and for general practitioner consultations. Our speci…cation encompasses both rationing by waiting list and by waiting line and does not restrict the way in which longer waits reduce the utility of treatment relative to no treatment (Hoel and Saether, 2003) . 5 The empirical evidence shows that increases in waiting time reduce demand for health care (Gravelle, Smith and Xavier, 2003; Martin and Smith, 1999; Martin et al, 2007 ).
An individual with illness i demands treatment i if and only if
whereb i (w i ; y) is the threshold bene…t level such that all those with a smaller bene…t do not seek treatment i. The threshold is increasing in the waiting time sinceb iw (w i ; y) = v
which may negative or positive depending on the e¤ect of illness and treatment on the marginal utility of income. 6 If income is additively separable 5 Our speci…cation includes the original Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) formulation of the model of rationing by waiting if we write v
where a i is the cost of getting on the list. 6 Empirical studies suggest that, controlling for a wide range of morbidity and other socio-economic characteristics, income has little impact on the number of GP visits but is positively associated with specialist visits and hospital stays (van Doorslaer et al, 2004; Morris et al, 2005) . from health and waiting time, the income sub-utility function is una¤ected by treatment, ill health has the same e¤ect on the income of the treated and untreated, then (2) is zero and those on higher incomes demand care as much as individuals with low income.
Demand for treatment i is
and
where D i is the per capita demand for treatment i from individuals with illness i. The supply of treatment i is z i . The waiting time for treatment i is determined by the market clearing condition
The equilibrium waiting time, when positive, is determined by (5) as
Resource allocation decisions result in three categories of treatment. Some treatments are not provided by the health service, which is equivalent to setting a su¢ ciently high waiting time (w i w 
Welfare
Welfare for an individual with income y is
where s N T i ; s T i are welfare if the individual has condition i and is not treated or treated and w is the vector of waiting times. The social welfare function is
The welfare formulation is quite general and is compatible with utilitarianism, more complicated Bergsonian individualistic welfare functions, and with extra welfarist (Culyer, 1991) value judgements, including simple health gain maximisation as in the allocation literature. The only restriction we impose is that welfare for a treated individual is increasing in health gain and decreasing in the waiting time:
The welfare maximising bene…t threshold b S i for consumption of health care by individuals with income y is de…ned by
Individuals may choose to consume too much (b In the utilitarian welfare function s
, so that individuals' decisions on health care consumption are respected in the sense that b i (w i ; y) = b S i (w i ; y). Even if it was possible to directly alter the bene…t thresholds (and hence demand) at given waiting times, there would be no welfare gain from doing so.
Policy in health care markets often re ‡ects paternalistic value judgements which imply that individuals consume too little or too much health care (Musgrave, 1959; Sandmo, 1983) . A common example is the belief that the use of health care should depend only on "need", de…ned as capacity to bene…t from health care b, and not on characteristics such as income. We can capture this notion, which is closely related to horizontal equity, with a welfare function in which
The welfare maximising treatment threshold de…ned by (9) is b S i (w i ; y) = b i (w i ; y o ) which is the same for individuals irrespective of their income level (and any other characteristics deemed irrelevant in assessing need). y o is the reference income required to generate the welfare maximising treatment threshold given the waiting time. Individual decisions on consuming health care will not be welfare maximising except for those with y = y o . Ifb iy is negative, expected use will be too high for those with y > y o and too low for those with y < y o . The literature on CER allocation rules embodies the extra welfarist value judgement that the aim of the health care system is to maximise the total health gain of the population (Garber 2000; Smith 2005 ). We could capture this value judgement by writing welfare as discounted health gain
where b is the health gain from health care with no waiting, and i (w i ) is a discount factor satisfying
with r i being the proportionate rate of decrease of the discount factor.
3 Priority setting between treatments
Optimal waiting times
Decision makers in the public health care service allocate resources amongst di¤erent treatments subject to an exogenously determined health service budget constraint:
where c i is the constant average and marginal cost of treatment i, and M the …xed health service budget. Health service decision makers allocate treatment (z i ), or equivalently choose waiting times, to maximise the social welfare function. The cost of meeting all demand generated by zero waiting times exceeds the budget:
and the optimal allocation satis…es
with complementary slackness, for all i.
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Increasing w i has two e¤ects on welfare. First, increasing the waiting time reduces welfare from treatment. The marginal welfare cost of waiting per treated patient is
Second, there is a welfare loss arising from the patients who decide not to seek treatment when the waiting time increases. The marginal threshold cost per treated patient is
is the social welfare reduction when the marginal patient with income y fails to seek treatment. When the waiting time increases, the bene…t threshold at which patients seek treatment is increased (b iw > 0) and s iy , so that the probability of consumption care when ill increases with income, then all individuals consume too little care and i > 0. With a smaller reference income some individuals have too high an expected consumption and some too low, so that it is possible that i < 0.
We can use (16) and (17) to write (15) as
where " iw = D iw w i =D i < 0 is the elasticity of demand for treatment i with respect to the waiting time. 
(ii) treatment i is an emergency treatment: w i = 0, and
(iii) treatment i is an elective treatment: w i 2 (0; w o i ) and
The optimal waiting time for elective care is higher the greater the cost of treatment and lower the greater the marginal cost of waiting ( i ) and the marginal threshold welfare cost ( i ) from patients displaced by higher waiting times.
Waiting time should be higher if demand is more elastic with respect to waiting time. A given reduction in provision will generate a smaller increase in waiting time the more elastic the demand. Waiting time is a deadweight loss: none of additional cost to consumers of having to wait longer accrues as a gain to anyone else (by contrast user charges paid by patients accrue to funders). Hence we should be more willing to reduce supply for treatments with more elastic demands.
Allocation in terms of cost e¤ectiveness ratios
Suppose that welfare from treatment is additively separable in income and multiplicatively separable in the bene…t and waiting time as:
The marginal cost of waiting per treated patient is
where
is the proportionate rate of decline in the discount factor i and B i (w i ) is the undiscounted health gain per treated patient. Note that B i depends on the wait because w i a¤ects the number of patients being treated throughb i .
The marginal threshold welfare cost of displaced patients per treated patient is
, the marginal threshold cost is positive because the welfare function takes account only of discounted health gains from treatment and ignores the factors which in ‡uence patient decisions on whether to seek treatment.
An increase in expenditure on treatment of £ 1 increases supply of the treatment by 1=c i . A unit increase in supply reduces the waiting time by 1= i D iw . A unit reduction in waiting time reduces waiting time costs at the rate i i D i = r i i B i i D i and welfare arising from additional patients treated increases at the rate i i D i . Thus, when the welfare function has (22), the marginal social value in terms of health gain from an additional £ 1 spent on treatment i is
Note that the marginal value of expenditure depends on the bene…t-cost ratio B i =c i which is the inverse of the CER. We can restate the conditions describing an optimal allocation of the budget across treatments in terms of the marginal value of expenditure on treatment i (25) and the shadow value of the budget constraint ( ):
Proposition 2 If welfare from treatment is additive separable in income and multiplicatively separable in waiting time and bene…t then at the optimal allocation (i) if treatment i is not provided then
where w o i is the waiting time at which demand is zero (D i (0) = 0) (ii) if treatment i is provided with zero wait then
(iii) if treatment i is provided with a positive wait then
A pure CER rule would provide treatment i if and only if B i (0)=c i exceeded the shadow marginal value of the health sector budget . Although the optimal allocation depends on the cost-e¤ectiveness ratios for di¤erent treatments, the CER based rule of allocating resources in reverse order of cost e¤ectiveness is not optimal. Since patients are not drawn at random from the pool of potential patients the undiscounted health bene…t per treated patient (B i (w i )) declines with the number of patients treated. Thus the CER for a treatment is determined by the allocation decision rather than determining it.
Suppose that all patients would have the same bene…t b i from a treatment, so that undiscounted health gain per treated patient B i = b i is constant and does not depend on the amount of treatment i. Suppose that v
iy is positive, then demand for treatment i is decreasing in the waiting time. Then even when the constant b i replaces B i (w i ) in Proposition 2, the decision to provide treatments is not based solely on their bene…t cost ratios. Although a higher bene…t cost ratio makes it more likely that a treatment will be provided it is also necessary to take account of the responsiveness of demand to waiting time, the marginal threshold welfare loss and the rate at which discounted health bene…ts decline with the waiting time. A higher discount rate r i makes it more likely that a treatment will be supplied since the cost of smaller supply (implying a longer wait) are greater. A higher threshold cost for patients displaced by a smaller supply will also increase supply. Finally, the more responsive demand is to waiting time the smaller will be the supply and the higher the waiting time.
User charges
The assumption that user charges were zero was made to simplify the exposition and notation. Allowing for positive …xed user charges makes very little di¤erence. Thus suppose that treatment i carries a charge of p i < c i . Then the threshold bene…t level isb i (y; p i ; w i ) determined by v After insertingb i (y; p i ; w i ) and D i (w i ; p i ) in the welfare function (8) and the budget constraint (13), the resulting …rst order conditions di¤er only in having c i p i replace c i . The only change to Proposition 1 required is that production cost c i is replaced with the net …nancial cost c i p i to the public sector the net …nancial cost to the public sector.
With the social welfare function satisfying (22), the value of an additional £ 1 spent on treatment i (25) becomes
where i = p i =c i is the copayment rate: the proportion of the unit cost of treatment recovered by a charge to the patient. Proposition 2 now holds with (29) replacing (25). A treatment is more likely to be provided, or have a larger supply, if it has a higher exogenous copayment rate.
4 Public sector allocation in the presence of a private sector
In many countries with public health care systems patients also have the option of buying treatment from private sector providers. We now show that the existance of the private sector a¤ects the form of the demand functions for public care but does not alter our main conclusions about the factors determining the optimal allocation of resources across treatments in the public sector. Individuals with condition i can obtain private sector treatment with no wait at price of m i or public sector treatment at no charge but after a wait of w i . We assume that utility is separable in income and health, and concave in income, to simplify the derivation of the results, though they do not depend on the assumption.
Public treatment yields utility v The demand for public treatment is
. Increases in waiting time reduce demand for public treatment:
When waiting time increases some public sector patients decide not to be treated (…rst term in (31)) and some patients opt for the private sector (second term in (31)). In terms of Figure 1 , an increase in w i shifts the locusb ] decide to switch from the public into the private sector. Total welfare is the sum of the utility of public patients, private patients and patients with no treatment: S = S GT + S P T + S N T where ]. An increase in waiting time has no e¤ect on the inframarginal untreated patients or private patients. It reduces the utility of the public patients directly and also changes the thresholds at which people choose public treatment rather than private treatment or no treatment. Although the marginal patients are indi¤erent, there will be a welfare gain or loss associated with the change in the number of patients treated in the public sector unless the social welfare function respects the patient decisions.
The marginal social value of an increase in waiting time for treatment i is, via the Lagrangean S 
The …rst term is the e¤ect on welfare via the displacement of patients who are forced out of the public sector and who do not get treated. The second is the e¤ect via the displacement of patients from the public into to private sector. Dividing (35) through by the number of treated patients ( i D i ) we can write the …rst order conditions on waiting times in an analogous manner to (18):
Conclusions
We have investigated the optimal allocation of a …xed health care budget across treatments when there is rationing by waiting and user charges are exogenous. Our main …nding is that the optimal waiting time is higher for treatments with demands which are more elastic to waiting time, higher costs, lower charges, and smaller marginal disutility from waiting. In addition, if the welfare function does not respect patient choices between treatment and no treatment, the waiting time should be lower for treatments where underconsumption of health care has a greater welfare cost. The general message is that optimal allocation across sectors must take account of way care is rationed within sectors. Hence, allocation rules based purely on cost e¤ectiveness ratios are suboptimal because they assume that there is no rationing within treatments. 
